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1 Introduction
Instability in export earnings is generally believed to be detrimental to growth and
macroeconomic performance (e.g., see Dawe 1996 and Alexander and Hansen 1998).
This realization has prompted several studies to identify the causes of export instability
(e.g., Charette 1985 and Love 1985). But as has since been rightly contended (e.g., Fosu
2001), it is the instability of the totality of foreign receipts—which includes not only
export earnings, but also foreign aid—that has detrimental macroeconomic effects. It
has also been specifically reported that instability of foreign aid receipts adversely
affects economic growth (e.g., Lensink and Morrisey 2000). This finding is not
unexpected for a number of reasons. The utility of aid to recipients is often seriously
compromised by delays in disbursement and the associated unpredictability of its
availability. This compounds the budgeting and macroeconomic capacity of already
weak recipient governments. As a result, in case of shortfalls as well as sudden
expenditure adjustments, these governments, already faced with a low tax base and
inflexibility to adjust tax rates, have to resort to ad hoc borrowing from the central bank.
For example, Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) report that shortfalls in aid are often
followed by reductions in government spending. Ultimately, the outcome is frequent
and unpredictable movements in government spending, monetary aggregates, exchange
rates, foreign reserves, and inflation rates.
However, while the reasons for delayed—and unpredictable timing of—disbursement of
official aid are, to some extent, traceable to the recipient governments themselves
(mainly due to their inability to meet aid conditionalities), donors can also be said to be
responsible. Donors can at times delay disbursements for reasons other than non-
fulfilment of conditionality. The reverse can also happen: donors turning a blind eye and
making disbursements even when conditionalities are not met (Kanbur 2000). The
question thus arises, why is donor timing of disbursements unpredictable and why the
delays. As important as this issue is, our investigation did not find any study that has
specifically analysed the reasons for the instability of foreign financial assistance,
despite the large number of available studies on export earning instability.1
Thus, there is a need to fill this gap, and this is what constitutes the present study’s
central objective. Specifically, it seeks to identify and test for the effects of a number of
donor country-specific factors that are potentially relevant determinants of donor
tendency to delay aid disbursements or to ‘renege’ on aid commitments. The analysis is
based on panel data derived by pooling 1970-2000 annual data over the 22 donors of
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
The remaining discussion is organized into 5 sections. In section 2, we present some
stylized facts on donor disbursements in relation to commitments. Section 3 discusses
the political economy of aid disbursements; section 4 gives the methodology while
section 5 is on the empirical results. The last section presents the summary and
conclusion.
                                                
1 Studies by Bulir and Hamann (2001) and Pallage and Robe (2001) which could be said to touch on the
issues addressed in the present paper relate aid disbursement shortfalls versus commitments only to
the economic cycles of the recipients.2
2 Some stylized facts on disbursements in relation to commitments
In Figure 1, annual disbursements in relation commitments over the 1970-2000 period
are shown for selected donor countries. The selection is not random, but criteria-based.
The eleven countries include the G7 members plus Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and
Sweden, the four donors are achieving the UN-prescribed aid-giving target of 0.7 per
cent of GNP. These eleven countries account for over 80 per cent of the total aid
volume of all 22 DAC members.
In an ideal situation where commitments are disbursed within a year (or at least a fairly
constant proportion of the commitments are disbursed every year), the pattern would
indicate almost a straight line, enabling the recipient to anticipate the expected volume
of aid better. But annual aid disbursements by bilateral donors compared to
commitments are characterized with very wide swings (Figure 1). Temporal
fluctuations—as measured by the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by
mean) of the disbursement-to-commitment ratio—are particularly high for France,
Germany, USA and Japan (Table 1). This may be surprising. As large donor countries
embrace almost all the developing countries as their recipient constituency, they should
have a more stable pattern of aid commitments in relation to disbursements. This
evidence supports the view that many of the factors causing disbursements to deviate
from commitments are donor-specific. On the whole, the underlying data show that
annual disbursements fell short of commitments in about 57 per cent of the data points
for all the donors.
Furthermore, if the swings are motivated by common external factors such as the
tendency for most recipients to violate aid conditionalities and thus collectively provoke
an almost simultaneous delay in the release of overdue commitments, the fluctuation
pattern should be similar for many of the donors. But the contrary is true. Virtually no
donor pair has a similar pattern. This is supported by the correlation matrix for
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France 0.19 -0.03 1.00
Germany 0.26 0.36 0.08 1.00
Italy -0.06 0.08 0.13 -0.19 1.00
Japan 0.05 0.29 -0.17 0.44 -0.04 1.00
Netherlands 0.22 0.30 0.12 0.27 -0.39 -0.01 1.00
Norway 0.36 0.30 0.04 0.21 -0.15 -0.06 0.12 1.00
Sweden -0.13 -0.07 0.14 -0.01 -0.15 -0.18 -0.31 0.21 1.00
UK 0.05 0.17 0.20 0.21 -0.35 0.02 0.45 0.22 0.11 1.00
US -0.06 -0.15 0.04 -0.29 -0.22 -0.14 0.24 0.06 -0.10 0.14 1.00
Mean ratio (%) 890.9 99.4 101.3 89.7 98.6 79.8 95.9 104.1 97.0 96.1 92.0
Std deviation (%) 17.4 24.9 10.9 11.8 31.5 12.1 16.3 25.4 24.9 17.2 12.6
Coefficient of
variation
5.2 4.0 9.3 7.6 3.1 6.6 5.9 4.1 3.9 5.6 7.3
Source: See text.3
Table 2
Disbursement-commitment ratios (in per cent, average of annual ratios) 1970-2000
1970-80 1981-90 1991-2000 1970-2000
Australia 95.0 106.0 96.7 99.1
Austria 99.1 117.4 85.3 100.5
Belgium 83.5 116.4 100.0 99.4
Canada 83.5 88.3 98.5 89.9
Denmark 87.8 96.1 115.5 99.4
Finland 72.2 78.8 102.4 84.9
France 100.4 95.7 107.8 101.3
Germany 82.2 92.5 95.4 89.7
Italy 116.0 69.9 108.1 98.6
Japan 76.7 81.6 81.5 79.8
Netherlands 81.6 100.5 107.1 95.9
New Zealand 91.9 120.0 98.5 103.8
Norway 85.2 113.2 115.8 104.1
Sweden 92.5 102.6 96.4 97.0
Switzerland 96.0 86.7 104.4 95.7
United Kingdom 86.1 103.4 99.9 96.1
United States 90.7 90.4 95.2 92.0
Overall average 89.4 97.6 100.5 95.7
Source: See  text.
the eleven donors in Table 1, which shows that the disbursement-to-commitment ratios
do not have a high positive correlation over the years (except between the correlation
for Japan and Germany, and for UK and Netherlands). The table also shows that the
correlation is even negative among many donor pairs (including Sweden and Denmark
that give aid to broadly common recipients). Again, this suggests that the swings are
dictated and dominated to a large extent by donor-specific factors.
In Table 2, we also show the decade averages of the disbursement-to-commitment ratio
for a larger number of donors, i.e., the ‘long-standing’ 17 DAC members for which aid-
giving statistics exist since early 1970s.2 Exhibiting an upward trend for the past 30
years, the ratio has risen from 89.4 per cent in 1970-80 to 97.6 per cent in 1981-90 and
to 100.5 per cent by 1991-2000. This is also the case for certain specific donors, notably
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands and Norway. Annual disbursement-to-
commitment percentage averaged 95.7 over the three decades, which implies that only
about 4.7 per cent of commitments were undisbursed. But this simple average distorts
the performance of individual donors. Furthermore, greater shortfalls and variations are
evident in the short-term of approximately a year, as well as for individual projects and
programmes. For example, Bulir and Hamann (2001) report that there is on average a
50 per cent deviation between the quarterly budgeted (and, hence, committed) aid and
that actually disbursed. In addition, the decade average, as a simple average of annual
ratios, does not give a realistic indication in monetary terms. This is because the
dollar  volume of disbursements for the last 30 years was only 86 per cent of the
dollar volume of commitments (i.e., only 86 per cent of donor obligations were actually
disbursed), which means a shortfall on average of 14 per cent. Also it might not be a
serious problem for a particular recipient that is able to properly diversify its receipts
                                                
2 The other five (newer) DAC members are Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain.4
geographically among donors. This is because failure of some donors to meet their
commitments in a particular budget year would likely be counterbalanced by some other
donors who are retrospectively meeting, in the same year, their overdue commitments.
But in reality this is not the case, as most recipients receive the majority of their
assistance from only a few donors, such as the former colonial master and one or two
others. So, failure by the donor to honour its obligation on time could have severe
effects on the recipients depending on these commitments, a fact compounding the
impact of the 14 per cent shortfall suggested by the data.
Source: See text
Fig. 1: Disbursement as Percentage of Commitment for G-7 Members and UN Target-Compliant Donors, 1970-2000 






























































































































































































3.1 Definition or concept of aid commitment
The definition given in the Statistical Reporting Directives (2000: 7) issued by OECD
and currently used by DAC in peer review exercises states:
A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official
agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary
funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified
financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit
of a recipient country or a multilateral agency.
In view of the above, the question that arises is, do donors in reality renege on their
commitments for reasons other than a breach by a recipient of the terms stipulated
above? The answer is yes.
First, there is no third party to arbitrate differences in the meaning of clause ‘specified
financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes’.3 In most cases, interpretation
is left to the donor’s unilateral discretion. With official loans, recipients probably have
some voice. This is because since quid pro quo is involved, a more formal agreement is
possible. But most bilateral resource transfers are in form of grants, thus limiting the
legal and moral choices of the recipients. The dictum, ‘a beggar has no choice’, largely
applies. As reviewed in subsection 3.2, this situation has allowed mundane factors like
administrative bottlenecks and understaffing to affect aid disbursements. Second, even
in cases of non-compliance with conditions by prospective recipients, donors—because
of pressure from domestic interest groups or in the case of multilateral banks, from
influential shareholders—have proceeded without concern for an obvious breach by the
recipient (e.g., see Kanbur 2000). Donors, when not inclined to release the funds for
economic or political reasons, may also resort to an unusually strict interpretation (see
subsection 3.3). Finally, apart from donors’ rather unilateral interpretation of the clause,
DAC definition (2000: 7) also stipulates that, ‘Members unable to comply with this
definition should explain the definition that they use’, which allows a more self-serving
definition to be adopted by some donors. This last reason means that available statistics
on aid commitments are not necessarily in line with the DAC definition given above.
3.2 Reasons for delays in aid disbursements: European Community aid
as a case study
The aim here is to use a case study to illustrate how administrative and political
problems interact to delay aid disbursements, often causing aid gaps. These delays have
nothing to do with recipient failure to fulfil their part of the bargain. See next subsection
                                                
3 It is noteworthy here that the report submitted in 2000 to the US Congress by its International
Financial Institution Advisory Committee (IFIAC 2000), under the chairmanship of Professor Allan
Meltzer, recommended the use of an independent third party in verifying compliance with their
recommended institutional reform loan conditionalities to be granted by multilateral development
banks. According to IFIAC (chapter 3), ‘… auditors, independent of both the borrowing government
and the official lender, would be appointed to review implementation of the reform program
annually’.6
for a discussion of a reverse situation in which aid disbursements are made prematurely
as a result of a different set of political factors.
Some insights into the politics underpinning the failure to honour aid commitments can be
gained from the Ninth Report of the British House of Commons’ Select Committee on
International Development (1999) issued in connection with European Commission aid.
Para  45 of the report lists incidents affected with what it refers to as ‘delays and
inefficiencies in disbursement’, thus:
Population Concern gave the Committee two examples of such delays:
the first was a delay of thirteen months in the disbursement of funds for
four mini-projects in Bolivia and Peru; in the second instance—a
community-based distribution programme in Karachi—the funding
situation became so dire that the director of a local NGO in Pakistan took
out a personal loan to pay staff salaries, using her residence as collateral.
As a result, partner NGOs have requested that Population Concern
should not seek financing from the European Community in future. The
Committee was also concerned to discover, in the course of its visit to
Brussels, that not a single penny of the 250 million Euro allocated for
reconstruction in Nicaragua in the wake of Hurricane Mitch had been
spent.
Also, para 46 of the report quotes one of the European Commission aid agency
bureaucrats who testified to the Committee on the reasons for the underspending of the
aid budget as follows:
One part of it is what I would call the normal time lag between
committing money for a program that is going to be implemented in
some years. This is perfectly normal … The second part of it is a backlog
based on very good reasons  …  where it is highly meaningful that we
have kept back money and not spent because the conditions were not
there … The third part of it, to keep it simple, is the real problem. The
money that we should have been able to spend within a normal time but
where we are simply slower, that is what I would call the real backlog.
The size of that is not easy to determine and it varies a lot from program
and region to region in the world.
Para 48, based on the European Commission’s Statement on Development Policy,
identifies the major problems faced by the Commission as including ‘a complex and
fragmented aid system, policies guided by instruments rather than by policy objectives,
lack of human resources, burdensome ex-ante financial controls, substandard monitoring
and evaluation procedures’. However, in para 43, the report moderates, or rather, modifies
this view somewhat by also subscribing to the opinion that:
…  it is not enough, however, simply to blame underspends on the
inefficient management of the Commission. The fundamental mistake
has been to allocate excessive funds in the first place for predominantly
political reasons.
The delay periods are also reported to be excessive in a number of cases. According to
the report (para 43):7
The average length of project/programme implementation has
continuously increased over the last few years with a corresponding trend
in the backlog of outstanding commitments that reached over 20 billion
Euro by the end of 1999. In the last five years the average delay in
disbursement of committed funds has increased from 3 years to 4.5
years. For certain programmes, the backlog of outstanding commitments
is equivalent to more than 8.5 years’ payments.
With regard to handling the backlog, para 49 indicates that the Commission was
considering an ‘examination of commitments prior to 1995 with a view to closing them
and review of 1995/96/97 dormant commitments’. The report (para 50) strongly
supports this step, arguing that, ‘It is better to close dormant commitments and not draw
down funds from member states than simply to have money spent by the EC quickly
and badly’. The implication of this is that deferred disbursement leads not only to
uncertainty in the timing of aid, but is also likely to reduce the ultimate volume of aid to
be made available.
3.3 Political economy of premature aid disbursements: Ghana’s World Bank loan
as a case study
Next we review the political processes and pressures that often lead to premature, as
opposed to delayed, disbursements of aid commitments. The major reason for delayed
disbursements of European Community aid is that, ‘The fundamental mistake has been
to allocate excessive funds in the first place for predominantly political reasons’. This
section reviews how these predominantly political reasons operate after the commitment
phase so as to lead to the fundamental mistake of disbursements before conditionality is
met.
According to Hopkins (2000), unlike other macro-based explanations which regard the
state as a more or less monolithic entity, an explanation of the volume of aid is based on
a micro-framework and the state is regarded as a coalition of different micro or interest
groups.4 This approach explains the process through which the motivation of the donor
state (self-interest and beneficiaries’ interests) is arrived at through bargaining and
lobbying among different interest or micro groups within the state, i.e., what Kanbur
(2000: 432) summarizes as ‘smaller special interest payoffs’. Prior knowledge of
internal political processes and the various interest groups within the state leads to better
understanding of the overall motivations of a donor state in aid-giving—or in reneging.
Thus, the causes for the inconsistency in aid disbursement practices are often cited to be
within this micro approach and the case study on Ghana reviewed below is
representative of these.
According to Hopkins (2000: 432-3):
                                                
4 Hopkins identified two other two approaches. In one approach, the donor, as a monolithic entity, seeks
to maximize its own benefits through aid allocation, and this may apply to Kanbur’s explanation
(2000) for US and France aid to Zaire in 1980s, as reviewed. The third approach involves bargaining
between the donor (again, as a monolithic entity) and the recipient and it is the outcome of this that
determines aid volume.8
It can be argued, indeed is argued, that aid has the most support from
groups inside donor countries that derive selective advantage from it.
These include firms with investments in recipient countries, or who
provide exports tied to aid, and bureaucracies with employees with
career interests in aid, including NGOs … Business firms with profits
linked to guarantees or direct payment from an aid account also actively
support aid levels in their home country.
But perhaps a more interesting picture of the aggressive lobbying by such special
interest groups is given in the eye witness account by Kanbur (2000) as the World Bank
resident representative in Ghana in 1992-93, when Ghana violated the budgetary
conditionality of the Bank’s structural adjustment credit. The Bank then suspended
release of the impending tranche. Based on this author’s more recent observation and
experience as IMF’s desk economist for an African country, we can confirm Kanbur’s
claim of the existence of pressure and coercion from donor-based interest groups in
seeking ‘premature’ approval of programmes with recipient countries for various self-
serving interests. According to Kanbur (2000: 414-5):
I came under pressure from several sources, some of them quite
surprising, to release the tranche with minimal attention to conditionality.
There was a steady stream of private sector representatives, domestic and
foreign, arguing for release of the tranche  …  Next in line were the
bilateral donors—even those who had tied themselves to the presumably
greater discipline of the World Bank by co-financing. Some of these had
‘fiscal year’ concerns—they feared the consequences within their
agencies of not releasing the funds in the fiscal year for which they were
slated … Yet others found their projects slowing up because government
counterparts funds were not available  …  Rather, like private sector
contractors, these aid agency personnel were dependent upon the
government releasing enough resources for the success of their specific
projects  …  I include in this list of donors the World Bank itself—
implementation of old projects, and development of new ones, would be
severely affected so long as the impasse lasted … Conditionality can be
introduced on paper with much pomp and circumstance, but when push
comes to shove, all of the pressures, mostly from the donor side, are to
look the other way when conditionality is violated.
In addition to pressure from these special interest groups, according to Kanbur
(2000:  415-6) other reasons why donor agencies have ‘to look the other way when
conditionality is violated’ include the corporate interests of donor country itself.
According to Kanbur:
The most obvious case of this is political clientelism. How else can one
explain the repeated tranche releases to Zaire and Senegal in the 1980s
and early 1990s, for example, despite continued failure to comply with
adjustment conditionality, except in terms of pressure from the United
States and France?
He also contends that similar pressure is often exerted so as to guarantee that the
recipient has the funds to service existing debt obligations in which a powerful donor
has vested interest. For he asserts that, ‘Other cases arise when heavy debt servicing (to9
the World Bank, the IMF, donor governments and private creditors) is involved; without
the inflow, the outflow of debt servicing might be interrupted. Côte d’Ivoire is an
example of a country where these forces have been at play’.5
4 Methodology
4.1 Postulated donor-specific determinants of deviations of disbursements
from commitments
It is not easy to quantify these donor-specific political and economic forces or to even
proxy some of them qualitatively, especially within the context of the present
pioneering type of study. Nevertheless, within the limits of available information and
statistics, an attempt is made here to isolate some of these forces for identification and
testing. Specifically, we test for the effects of the following factors:
i)  Fraction of total aid that is procurement-tied: Among the stakeholders with
vested interests in aid disbursements are the exporters supplying the goods being
financed with aid. Therefore, the higher the proportion of aid that is
procurement-tied, the greater the vested interest and, hence, the shorter the delay
in translating commitments to disbursements, i.e., the higher the disbursement-
to-commitment ratio.
ii)  The share of aid to the poorest recipients: Various donor-specific commercial
interests associated with aid- or export-related investments, etc. are expected to
be satisfied better if aid is given to medium- or high-income recipients, as
opposed to low-income ones. As noted by Hopkins (2000: 433) in explaining the
recent downward trend in aid volume, ‘As aid has shifted from Asia to Africa,
and from fast- to slow-growing countries, the results sought in these recipients
promise fewer political and economic benefits for export or financial interests
within donors. Aid has less relevance as a way to open recipients’ markets if
those markets have very small potential’. Thus, lobbying by donor-based
interests to speed up disbursements should be less aggressive in the case of aid
commitments to poorer, weaker recipients. We therefore expect a higher fraction
of donor aid to relatively poor recipients to reduce the observed overall
disbursement-to-commitment ratio.6
                                                
5 Although the primary concern of the present study is not with the disbursement-commitment decisions
of the multilateral financial institutions’, it should be noted that they too are susceptible to a ‘double
standard’ phenomenon similar to the bilateral aid agencies, albeit at times for different reasons. As
pointed out in the IFIAC report (2000: chapter 2), ‘Despite its influence on developing countries, the
IMF often fails to enforce its conditions. Enforcement of conditions is not uniform or predictable, and
differences in enforcement may reflect the political power of recipients to avoid compliance’. But in
case of the World Bank, its own main reason is attributed by the report to negative or perverse
incentive problems within its own internal operations, as opposed to pressures from outside.
According to IFIAC (chapter 3), ‘Incentives to lend for lending’s sake are built into the structure of
the Banks. Internal budget resources are awarded where loan volumes are high, not where the number
of worthwhile projects is highest … Often the staff is rewarded on the amount of funds disbursed’.
Because of this, the staff are anxious to disburse funds, just as in the case of bilateral aid agencies.
6 Another reason for this is the probability that poorer recipients might lack the capacity to meet the aid
conditionalities and may be more prone to cause the so-called aid fatigue in donors. But this is not10
iii)  The proportion of aid constituting pure grants: As discussed in the previous
section, a loan aid commitment has the semblance of a formal contract since a
financial quid pro quo is involved, introducing a more binding obligation. But a
pure grant commitment, although formalized, would appear more in the nature
of gift giving, which would be prone to non-fulfilment at the donor’s discretion.
In other words, grant commitments seem to have a built-in flexibility for
reneging. Thus, we expect the overall aid disbursement-to-commitment ratio to
be lower the higher the share of pure grants in the total aid package.
iv)  Donor’s existing degree of generosity: The higher the existing level of
generosity (measured by average aid commitment and disbursement in relation
to GDP), the greater the scope for reneging the existing level of commitment. On
the other hand, commitments made by less generous donors (e.g., USA) are
more or less for bare ‘necessities’ (mainly to protect national interests), and their
disbursement would be difficult to scale down without adversely affecting the
interests that prompted the commitments in the first place. As a result, we expect
a high level of generosity to reduce the fraction of commitments being
disbursed.
v)  Economic growth and phase of economic cycle: Based on economic logic, high
growth of donor economy (GDP) should enhance the country’s ability to meet its
aid commitment similarly as to when the donor is experiencing a rising
economic cycle (as opposed to recession).
vi)  Level of per capita income: This proxies the level of affluence of the donor as
well as other factors associated with affluence. Here, we are not positing a
particular direction of its effect as such, but merely wish to test for its effect.
vii)  Size of government and fiscal balance: There is no definite a priori channel of
the effect of the size of government (government spending-to-GDP ratio) on
disbursement-to-commitment relationship. Nevertheless, one can speculate that
the fiscal effect (or benefit) of a shortfall in the fulfilment of commitments by a
given percentage looms large in the national budget, the lower the existing
government expenditure-to-GDP ratio. For this reason, high ratio of government
spending to GDP should increase the disbursement-commitment ratio. With
regard to fiscal balance, economic logic suggests that the chance of meeting
commitments should be high if fiscal surplus is also high, i.e., a positive
relationship is posited.
viii)  Political factors: As reviewed in the previous section, politicians and political
actors (including lobby groups and different branches of government) have their
own vested interests and these affect not only aid allocation at the commitment
stage but also at the disbursement stage. The extent to which such interests are
articulated and become effective depends on the constitutional and genuine
power relations between the executive and legislature. One indicator of these
relations is the extent of polarization or difference in orientation among the
executive and legislature, i.e., the veto power. High degree of polarization is
likely to increase aid commitments in order to please contending interests of the
                                                                                                                                              
necessarily a strong factor, as a typical donor must have taken into account such low-income
recipient-specific weakness before making a commitment.11
two arms of government (and to ensure budgetary approval). But, at the
disbursement stage, the existing veto (say, by the legislature) may not be as
binding and eventual disbursement may subsequently be more ‘realistic’ and be
based more on actual national interest. A similar indicator is the extent of checks
and balances (between the executive and legislature) and, just as in the case of
political polarization, a high level of checks and balances is likely to reduce the
fraction of commitments being disbursed. Two alternative measures for both
political polarization and checks and balances are employed in the study, as
explained below.
ix)  Trend factor: As pointed out in connection with Table 2, the
disbursement-to-commitment ratio has increased over the last three decades.
Many miscellaneous, mainly qualitative time-related factors could be
responsible for this observation, beyond what can be explained by the explicitly
considered factors (for example, per capita income level). To implicitly capture
these factors, we include a time trend variable which, after controlling for the
effect of those aforementioned regressors, would indicate whether the share of
commitment being disbursed has been showing a rising or declining trend over
the past three decades.
x)  Dummy variable for being a G7 member country: Members of the G7 donor
group account for about two-thirds of the total aid volume and they are assumed
to have greatest economic—if not also political—influence on the international
scene. We include this dummy variable to see whether this international
importance has a bearing on their propensity to disburse aid commitments.
4.2 Model specification
We specify for estimation a regression equation of the form:
yit = xitβ  + uit (i = 1, 2, …22; t = 1, 2 …T)( 1 )
where:
y  = the dependent variable, which is the (logarithm of) aid
disbursement-to-commitment ratio;
x = the vector of the explanatory variables discussed above;
β  = the vector of the explanatory variables’ parameters, the estimates of which are
to be derived;
u  = the vector of stochastic term that is assumed to satisfy most of the usual
conditions; and
i, t subscripts = indicators of country and time subscripts, respectively, in the panel
data.
The above specification implies that time-series data are pooled across the countries to
form a panel dataset used to estimate the equations. Specifically, annual data over the12
1970-2000 period are pooled across the 22 donor countries. But the resulting panel data
are unbalanced in the sense that values are missing in a random manner with respect to
both countries and variables. Also, because of this unbalanced nature of the data, we
include only few explanatory variables (the trend, per capita income and aid generosity
ratio) that are available for all countries for almost all the years in all the equations
estimated while other explanatory variables are included one or two at a time. With this
procedure, not only is the incidence of multicollinearity minimized, but the available
number of data points used in deriving the estimation are also maximized, as the
inclusion of all or most explanatory variables in a particular equation would drastically
reduce the usable data points. We employ the random-effect method in deriving the
panel data estimates.7 Evidence on the existence (or lack) of stability of the parameter
estimates is indirectly made available because several reported equation estimates cover
different periods, as dictated by data availability, with only some regressors (per capita
income and donor generosity ratio) featuring in all the equations. By this, temporal
stability of the parameter estimates of these common regressors can be inferred while
that of most others is hardly crucial in view of the fact that the estimates do not cover
long periods.
Given the nature of the explanatory variables, we have little or no reason to anticipate
their endogeneity. Thus, we employ OLS technique within the framework of which we
adjust for any presence of heteroscedasticity through the method of covariance matrix
correction suggested by White (1980).
4.3 Separate estimates for grant disbursement-to-commitment ratio
Our discussion so far relates to equations with the total aid disbursement-to-
commitment ratio as the dependent variable and we take account of the grant
component only by including the preponderance of grants in total aid as a regressor. But
as we discuss later, this factor is found to have affected the disbursement-commitment
ratio with a strong statistical significance, and it is enlightening to test whether the
disbursement-to-commitment ratio of this ever-increasing component of official aid
(accounting for 71 per cent of the total over the sample period, in terms of the dollar
magnitudes) indeed reacts differently to some or all of the determining factors
postulated above.
To accomplish this, we specify and estimate parallel equations with the
disbursement-to-commitment ratio for grants now replacing the one for total aid as
specified above in equation 1. Also, the overall generosity ratio (total aid volume-GDP
ratio) regressor is now replaced by the grant generosity ratio (grants-to-GDP ratio)
while the dominance of grants in total aid volume now ceases to be applicable and is
therefore dropped. The resulting estimates are reported separately, for easy comparison.
                                                
7 This method decomposes the uit in the above equation thus: uit = ε i + λ t + η it (where ε  is the individual
effect, λ  the time effect, and η  the purely random effect) and incorporates this assumption into GLS
technique used in estimating the β . The fixed-effect alternative also gives practically the same results
but the presence of the G7 membership dummy variable makes it inapplicable if this dummy variable
is included and, hence, we opt for the random-effect alternative instead.13
4.4 Determining the channel and sequence of effects of factors
on disbursement-to-commitment ratio
A particular observed effect of a factor on disbursement-to-commitment ratio arises
because the effects are not the same on the underlying commitments and disbursements,
as shown in the matrix below. As can be seen, it is possible for a factor to be observed
as affecting the disbursement-to-commitment ratio without its having any effect at all on
the underlying disbursement, if it only affects the underlying commitments, as in
combinations (i) and (v) in the matrix.
As an example, the expected positive effect of a high proportion of procurement-tied aid
on the disbursement-to-commitment ratio cam be explained as follows. Although it
could have some positive effect on aid commitment (since exporters might lobby for
more aid to be allocated or committed towards this end), its positive effect on aid
disbursement is expected to be larger and more aggressive because exporters would also
want to get paid quickly. This would contrast with the pressure from consultants and
those who provide technical assistance services. This category of aid lobbyists would
press for more aid commitments to assure more consultancy jobs, but their interests and
pressure would wane thereafter as it is of no concern to them whether funds are
eventually disbursed to implement the aid projects on which they have already been
consulted and reimbursed. So, the effect of their own pressure would likely fall into
Matrix
Possible channels of effects of various factors on disbursement-to-commitment ratio
Direction of observed effect of
a factor on aid disbursement-
commitment ratio
Combination of effects on the underlying commitments and
disbursements that can give rise to the observation
(i) Negative effect on the commitment coupled with nil effect on
disbursement
(ii) Negative effect on the commitment coupled with positive effect
on disbursement
(iii) Negative effect on the commitment coupled with negative but
weaker effect on disbursement
Net positive effect on
disbursement-to-commitment
ratio
(iv) Positive effect on the commitment coupled with positive but
stronger effect on disbursement
(v) Positive effect on the commitment coupled with nil effect on
disbursement
(vi) Positive effect on the commitment coupled with negative effect
on disbursement
(vii) Positive effect on the commitment coupled with positive but
weaker effect on disbursement
Net negative effect on
disbursement-to-commitment
ratio
(viii) Negative effect on the commitment coupled with negative but
stronger effect on disbursement14
combination (v) or (vii) in the matrix and is therefore likely to be negative on
disbursement-to-commitment ratio.8 The overall effects of most of the other factors can
be analysed in the same fashion.
To empirically identify and test for the channels of the effects, we specify and estimate
equations (parallel to that specified in equation 1 above) separately for aid disbursement
and commitment (each normalized by GDP), and include the same list of regressors
discussed above (except that, now, aid generosity ratio would no longer be applicable as
it has a very close relationship with the present dependent variables).9
4.5 Data sources and how variables are measured
The dependent variable, disbursement-to-commitment ratio, is the average of the
contemporaneous and 1-year forward lag of gross disbursement values divided by a
similar average for commitment values. With regard to the disbursement-to-GDP and
commitment-to-GDP ratios, the same lag structure is implemented for each of the
numerator and denominator. This averaging of contemporaneous and lagged values is to
smoothen the year-to-year discrepancies between aid commitments and disbursements.
Disbursements need not synchronize temporally with commitments due to cut-off
accounting procedures, inevitable administrative and communication delays, and
because of the fact that commitment terms and conditions generally do not assume
disbursements to be instantaneous. A commitment made in December is unlikely to lead
to disbursement being made during the same calendar year. Taking a 2-year average
partially caters for this.
For symmetry, the same averaging of current and 1-period future lag is retained for aid-
related independent variables, namely generosity or aid-GDP ratio, grant-total aid ratio,
procurement-tied aid ratio (which is the ratio of fully tied aid to total aid), and the
fraction of aid to lowest-income recipients (defined in the data source as recipient
countries with per capita income of less than US $760 in 1998).10 All these variables
are from the OECD’s International Development Statistics, IDS (online), except the
GDP statistics which are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2000
(online). The logarithm values of each of the variables are employed, and since it is a
pure fraction what is actually employed, each is computed as log(1+x), where x is the
variable in pure fraction form.
The government expenditure-GDP ratio is also in logarithm form, similarly computed as
log(1+x), while per capita income (in 1995 US$), also in logarithm, is computed simply
as log(x). Economic growth is the rate of real GDP growth (in pure fraction, as opposed
to percentage). The indicator of the phase of economic cycle is computed as the
residuals obtained from regressing the logarithm of real GDP index on time trend, so
                                                
8  We do not actually test for this factor in the present study as we do not have a good proxy for it.
9 The alternative technique we explored was to estimate an equation for the disbursement-GDP ratio
and include the same list of explanatory variables, after controlling for the effect of commitment-GDP
ratio (i.  e., by also including commitment-GDP ratio as an additional explanatory variable). This
yielded similar results.
10 These recipients collectively accounted for 45 per cent of total aid commitments over the sample
period.15
that positive and negative values of residuals, respectively, correspond to rising and
falling phases of the cycle. The data for all these are from the World Bank source.
Concerning the variables on domestic polity, the source is Beck et al. (online). The
indicator or index of political polarization (whose value ranges between 0 and 2)
consists of two types.11 Following the data source, the first is maximum difference in
orientation between two veto powers, defined as the president and largest government
party in a presidential system (or the biggest three coalition members in a parliamentary
system). The second index differs from the first only if the president’s party (or, under
the parliamentary system, the prime minister’s party) has an absolute majority in the
legislature, in which case no polarization (i.e., zero value) is deemed to exist. The
checks-and-balances indicator, on the other hand, records the number of veto players in
a polity and indicates the extent of formal constitutional control on political
decisionmakers. Again, there are two types, with some intricate technical differences
between the two.12
5 Empirical results
5.1 Presentation of the results
The empirical results for the total aid disbursement-commitment ratio equation are
presented in Table 3 while those of the total aid disbursement-to-GDP ratio and total aid
commitment-to-GDP ratio are reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The parallel
estimates with respect to equations for the grant disbursement-commitment ratio, grant
disbursement-GDP ratio and grant commitment-GDP ratio are reported in Parallel
Tables 3A, 4A, and 5A (in the Appendix), respectively. For the sake of brevity, these
are given in the Appendix but occasional references are made to them in evaluating the
results.
5.2 Evaluation of the results
The tables on the empirical results show that, judging from the adjusted R
2 values, the
equations generally have a good fit. The fit is better for the disbursement-GDP ratio
equations than for the corresponding commitment-GDP ratio equations, suggesting that
donors tend to be more systematic and show greater consistency in behaviour with
respect to disbursements than with respect to commitments. In the same manner, the fit
is generally better for grant-related equations reported in the Parallel Tables 3A to 5A
than for the corresponding total aid-related equations reported in Tables 3 to 5. Also, the
t-values of the parameter estimates are generally higher for grant-related equations. In
cases where the t-values barely manage to pass statistical significance test at the margin
(or narrowly miss the test) in the total aid-related equations, they comfortably pass the
                                                
11 The simple correlation between the two is 0.384.
12 The simple correlation between the two is 0.767. The description of technicalities involved in
computing each and of the differences between both run into pages in the data source. Suffice here to
state that they both take cognisance of the executive arm of government as well as the existence and
number of legislative arms of government, adjusted for the degree of competitiveness involved in
electing them.16
test in the grant-related equations. The reason for this is not far-fetched. Total aid is not
a homogenous concept. In fact, it is a misnomer, as it is derived by mechanically adding
grants and loans. Nevertheless, qualitatively, the results are broadly similar and the
effects of the various factors tested are found to operate along the same directions in
both equation categories. Thus, total aid-related equation estimates are going to be our
benchmark in evaluating the results.
Table 3

























































































































































































































































































































No. of obs 522 483 521 522 328 379 388 421 413 489
Adjusted R
2 0.305 0.232 0.291 0.275 0.419 0.350 0.359 0.344 0.355 0.288
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the ratio of ODA disbursement to its commitment;
(ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter estimate is
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute sense, not less than 2.6,
2.0, and 1.6, respectively.17
Table 4































































Generosity ratio (net aid
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No. of obs 553 483 521 522 328 379 388 421 413 489
Adjusted R
2 0.769 0.776 0.777 0.770 0.903 0.880 0.876 0.872 0.872 0.813
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the ratio of disbursement of ODA to GDP;
  (ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter estimate is
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute sense, not less than 2.6,
2.0, and 1.6, respectively.18
Table 5



































































































































































































































































































No. of obs 522 483 521 522 328 379 388 421 413 489
Adjusted R
2 0.741 0.749 0.742 0.742 0.819 0.827 0.826 0.823 0.823 0.775
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the ratio of commitment of ODA to GDP.
  (ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter estimate is
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute sense, not less than 2.6,
2.0, and 1.6, respectively.
5.2.1 Trend factor
Having controlled for the effects of the various factors explicitly included as regressors
in the equations, estimates in Table 3 show that the disbursements-commitment ratio
exhibits a definite positive trend over the decades. This is due to the fact that, although
disbursement generosity ratio (disbursement-GDP ratio) has been on a declining trend,
it is less rapid than the decline in the commitment generosity ratio (commitment-GDP
ratio), resulting in a trend increase in disbursement-commitment relationship. This
interpretation is based on the positive and statistically very significant coefficients of the19
trend regressor in the disbursement-commitment ratio equations (Table 3) coupled with
its negative and statistically significant coefficients in Tables 4 and 5, with the values
and statistical significance being greater absolutely in Table 5 than in Table 4.
5.2.2 Level of per capita income
Donors’ level of per capita income does not have a definite effect on the shares of aid
commitments being actually disbursed. But based on the balance of the weak evidence
available, the per capita level of income has a negative effect on the ratio. Despite the
fact that it has definite positive effects on the aid disbursement generosity ratio, this is
almost of the same magnitude as its positive effect on the commitment generosity ratio
so that the effect on disbursement ratio, though negative, is not statistically significant.
This inference is based on the disbursement-commitment ratio equations in Table 3
where the coefficients are negative but not statistically significant, while they are
positive and statistically very significant in the disbursement and commitment
generosity ratio equations in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
5.2.3 Being a G7 member country
This apparently has a negative effect on the disbursement-commitment ratio (Table 3).
It has a mixed (depending on the equation) statistically insignificant effect on the
commitment generosity ratio (Table 5) and a negative though statistically insignificant
effect on the disbursement generosity ratio (Table 4), the net effect of which translates
into a negative effect (that is generally statistically significant at the margin) on the
disbursement-commitment ratio. This suggests that donors with the greatest influence in
international economy (and, possibly, polity) tend to disburse smaller fractions of their
aid commitments than other donors.
5.2.4 Donor’s generosity ratio
More generous donors tend to disburse smaller proportions of their aid commitments
than others. This is because the generosity ratio coefficients are negative and
statistically significant in many equations and this tendency is much more clearly
established in the corresponding grant disbursement-commitment ratio equation
estimates in Parallel Table 3A where the negative coefficient is statistically very
significant in all equations. This finding is in line with what we posited earlier. The
scope to disburse less than committed by relatively parsimonious donors should be
smaller, since much of their commitments constitute more or less the bare minimum
necessary for their national interests. Consequently, their commitments are less prone to
being under-disbursed.
5.2.5 Preponderance of grants in total aid
Donors who give more aid in the form of grants tend to disburse less of their
commitments than other donors. Although relative preponderance of grants in aid has
some positive effect on the commitment generosity ratio (Table 5), this positive effect is
found to be unsustainable until the disbursement stage (by which time it vanishes,
Table 4), so that the overall effect on the disbursement-commitment ratio is negative
(Table 3). This is in line with expectations. Loan commitments constitute more formal
and binding contracts than grant commitments, and should therefore be less prone to
deferral at relatively slight conditionality-based excuse.20
5.2.6 Preponderance of pro-poor recipients in total aid
Similarly, donors who give a larger proportion of their aid to lowest-income recipient
countries seem to disburse less of their commitments than other donors. These pro-poor
donors do not appear to differ from other donors with regard to generous at the
commitment stage, as the relevant coefficients are statistically insignificant in the aid
commitment generosity equation (Table 5 and Parallel Table 5A). But at the
disbursement stage, they are observed to defer or ‘renege’, due presumably to a relative
paucity of various commercially oriented lobby groups to stimulate interest. This
inference is based on the coefficient of this variable in the disbursement generosity ratio
equations that is negative (though statistically insignificant) in Table 4 and also in
Parallel Table 4A (where the negative coefficient is statistically very significant). Thus,
the overall outcome is a statistically significant negative effect on the disbursement-
commitment ratio (Table 3 and Parallel Table 3A). Again, this finding is in line with the
explanation adduced earlier. The type of aid given to lowest-income recipients is
unlikely to generate interest for the donor-based lobby groups in connection with fund
disbursements, so that any relatively mild conditionality breach might trigger
disbursement deferral.
5.2.7 Economic growth
Paradoxically, high economic growth is noted to have reduced the fraction of aid
commitment being disbursed. Its negative effect on the commitment generosity ratio
(Table 5 and Parallel Table 5A) is further aggravated on the disbursement generosity
ratio (Table 4 and Parallel Table 4A), resulting in an overall statistically significant
negative effect on the disbursement-to-commitment ratio (Table 3 and Parallel
Table 3A). A probable explanation of this finding is that aid commitment reacts with a
lag to donors’ economic growth and its disbursement reacts with even a further lag, thus
accounting for the observed negative coefficient of economic growth in disbursement-
commitment ratio equations. Also, economic growth, by definition, increases GDP (the
denominator of the aid-GDP ratio) so that there is already a built-in inverse non-
behavioural relationship between economic growth and each of commitment and
disbursement generosity ratios, which the lags in aid response to economic growth
would therefore be unable to offset. Notwithstanding this attempt to provide an
explanation, this finding still remains rather puzzling.
5.2.8 Phase of economic cycle
The phase of economic cycle has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on the
total aid disbursement-to-commitment ratio. During a rising phase, the disbursement
generosity ratio becomes enhanced (Table 4 and Parallel Table 4A) almost—but not
exactly—to the same extent as the commitment generosity ratio (Table 5 and Parallel
Table 5A). The fact that the positive effect of economic upturn at the commitment stage
becomes tempered at the disbursement stage supports the view mentioned above, i.e.,
that disbursements probably display greater lag than commitments in responding to
economic growth or, in the present case, to changes in the tempo of economic activities.
The overall result of these is a negative but statistically insignificant effect of an
upturning phase of economic cycle on total aid disbursement-commitment ratio (Table 3
and Parallel Table 3A).21
5.2.9 Procurement-tied in relation to total aid
A higher fraction of procurement-tied aid leads to a greater share of committed aid
volume being disbursed. The fraction of aid that is procurement-tied does not appear to
have significantly affected the commitment generosity ratio (Table 5 and Parallel
Table 5A). But at the disbursement stage, it becomes a factor to be reckoned with, as it
is found to have a statistically significant positive coefficient in the disbursement
generosity ratio equations (Table 4 and Parallel Table 4A). As a result, it is also found
to have a statistically significant positive coefficient in the disbursement-commitment
ratio equations (Table 3 and Parallel Table 3A). This finding is in line with
expectations, as donor country-based exporters should be more proactive and aggressive
in lobbying to ensure the release of funds for their actual or anticipated supplies.
5.2.10 Government size
Large-sized donor governments (i.e., with large government spending-GDP ratio)
disburse higher proportion of their aid and grant commitments. Although a high
government expenditure-GDP ratio is observed to have a definite, statistically
significant positive effect on the commitment generosity ratio (Table 5 and Parallel
Table 5A), the positive effect is intensified further at the disbursement stage (Table 4
and Parallel Table 4A), so that the overall effect on the disbursement-commitment ratio
is positive (Table 3 and Parallel Table 3A).
5.2.11 Fiscal balance position
The ratio of budget surplus to total government spending has a weak (i.e., statistically
insignificant) but expected positive effect on the fraction of commitments being
disbursed. For total aid-related equations, the marginally significant positive effect it
has on the commitment generosity ratio (Table 5) becomes a little stronger on the
disbursement generosity ratio (Table 4), resulting in a statistically insignificant positive
overall effect on the total aid disbursement-commitment ratio (Table 3). In the case of
grant-related equations, its positive but insignificant effect on the commitment
generosity ratio (Parallel Table 5A) becomes nil on the disbursement generosity ratio
(Parallel Table 4A), but the overall result on the disbursement-commitment ratio is
positive and moderately significant. On the whole, the evidence in support of a positive
effect of fiscal surplus on disbursement-commitment ratio is weak, which should not be
surprising as budgetary position need not be the major reason to prompt a donor to
withhold disbursement of pledged aid. Also, the fact that total aid allocated accounted
for a mere 1.2 per cent of donor government total expenditure over the three decades
implies that thrift or economy in aid disbursement would not achieve much in balancing
the budget.
5.2.12 Political factors
The greater the number of checks and balances in the political system, the lower the
fraction of aid being disbursed. Similarly, the higher the degree of polarization or
difference in orientation among the veto players (executive and parliament), the lower
the disbursement-commitment ratio. Each of the two alternative measures of the extent
of checks and balances as well as each of the two alternative indicators of the degree of
polarization is found to have a positive effect on the aid (and grant) commitment
generosity ratio (Table 5 and Parallel Table 5A), suggesting, as posited earlier, that
more aid commitments would be needed to satisfy the resulting, more diverse interests
of the implied veto wielders. But this commitment-stage effect, while it still exists at the22
disbursement stage, is tempered to some extent (Table 4 and Parallel Table 4A) so that
the overall effect on the disbursement-commitment ratio is negative and statistically
significant in most of the equations (Table 3 and, especially, Parallel Table 3A). This
suggests that many aid allocation-related political interactions (pressure, intrigue, etc.
between the legislature and the executive) are likely more active at ensuring that more
aid is committed to their preferred causes or recipients, and not much for the follow-up
phase of ascertaining that aid is actually disbursed, i.e., ensuring that conditionality
breaches and transgressions by their preferred recipients are overlooked.
6 Summary and conclusion
Empirical studies have shown that delay and, hence, uncertainty in foreign aid receipts,
just like export earning instability, adversely affect the economic growth of recipient
countries. But while the causes of export instability have been studied in the literature,
no single attempt at empirically identifying the causes of aid-receipt uncertainty has
come to notice. While there is a traditional perception that delays in receiving promised
aid are due to recipient-specific causes, attention is currently also focused on donor-
specific causes, including the reasons that induce donors to use double standards in
interpreting and enforcing the conditionalities of their aid in the face of conspicuous
breaches. These create greater havoc for the recipient than the disbursement delays
resulting from self-induced recipient-specific reasons, most of which could be
anticipated by the recipient and, hence, taken into account in budgetary preparations and
macroeconomic management.
In light of the above, the study makes a pioneering and exploratory attempt at
identifying donor-specific reasons for delaying disbursements of aid commitments.
Annual panel data over the 1970-2000 periods for the 22 members of OECD’s DAC
donor group are used to carry out the econometric study. Several possible determinants
that may govern donor’s decision on the share of committed aid for disbursement are
tested for and the highlights of our findings are as follows:
−   If we control for the effects of other tested factors, as discussed below, the fraction
of aid commitment being disbursed exhibits a definite positive trend over the
decades;
−   Donor’s level of per capita income does not have a decisive effect on the fraction
of aid commitments actually disbursed;
−   Being a G7 member country apparently has a negative association with the fraction
of aid commitments being disbursed;
−   More generous donors tend to disburse a smaller share of their aid commitments
than others;
−   Also, donors who give more of their aid in form of grants tend to disburse less of
their commitments than other donors do;
−   Similarly, donors who give more aid to lowest-income recipient countries are
found to disburse less of their commitments than other donors;23
−   Paradoxically, a donor’s high economic growth is found to have reduced the
fraction of aid commitment released for disbursement;
−   An upturning phase of the economic cycle has a negative but statistically
insignificant effect on the fraction of total aid commitment disbursed;
−   A higher fraction of aid that is procurement-tied leads to a greater fraction of a
given committed aid volume disbursed;
−   Large-sized donor governments (i.e., with large government spending-GDP ratio)
disburse higher proportion of their aid and grant commitments than small-sized
ones. Also, there is some weak evidence that a donor’s fiscal surplus position
enhances its tendency to disburse aid commitments;
−   The greater the number of checks and balances in the political system, the lower
the fraction of aid being disbursed. Similarly, the higher the degree of polarization
or difference in orientation among the veto players (executive and parliament), the
lower the disbursement-commitment ratio.
Most of the above findings are in line with expectations, and the rationale for this is
discussed in the text. While we cannot be very definite on these findings, especially in
view of their rather exploratory nature, we hope nevertheless that they shed some light
on the factors that affect the uncertainties of aid being received. We also hope that the
findings will be complemented in future by similar studies to determine the reasons why
recipients, in the first place, fail to meet aid conditionalities. If conditionality is always
met, there is little cause for donors to delay aid disbursements. The present study,
however, focussed on the factors that induce erratic behaviour on the part of donors so
that breaches of conditionalities are at times overlooked and at other times, not.
The above study has been carried out with donor-based data. Another perspective to the
same problem is to use recipient country-based data, which would shed light on the
recipient-specific factors and characteristics (be they economic or political) that
influence donors’ decision or propensity to disburse committed aid. Of course, it can be
argued that the adverse effect of the failure to disburse aid because of recipient-specific
factors is less detrimental to recipient’s government budgeting, because the affected
country would have been aware in advance that they were unlikely to meet the implicit
or explicit aid conditionalities. Nevertheless, doing so would still provide information
that could be useful in other policy respects and would complement the results of the
present study, whose scope could not accommodate such an extension for reason of
space. This is therefore suggested as a challenge for future studies along this line.24
Appendix: Parallel empirical results for grant-related equations
Parallel Table 3A









































































































































































































































































No. of obs 483 521 522 328 379 388 421 413 489
Adjusted R
2 0.304 0.359 0.354 0.433 0.459 0.477 0.468 0.469 0.391
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the ratio of disbursement of ODA grants to commitment of ODA grants;
(ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter estimate is
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute sense, not less than 2.6,
2.0, and 1.6, respectively.25
Parallel Table 4A





















































































































































































































































No. of obs 483 521 522 328 379 388 421 413 489
Adjusted R
2 0.791 0.780 0.779 0.913 0.889 0.885 0.879 0.879 0.810
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the ratio of disbursement of ODA grants to GDP;
(ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter estimate is
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute sense, not less than 2.6,























































































































































































































































No. of obs 483 521 522 328 379 388 421 413 489
Adjusted R
2 0.746 0.733 0.736 0.847 0.829 0.833 0.823 0.823 0.761
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is the ratio of commitment of ODA grants to GDP;
(ii) The numbers in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t-values. A parameter estimate is
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels if its t-value is, in absolute sense, not less than 2.6,
2.0, and 1.6, respectively.27
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